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The Turkish interest groups in Brussels 
Claire Visier 
Turkish lobbies are quite numerous in Brussels. They are 
very well known by the different European interest groups 
and European institutions which work with them and 
accept them. I would like first to focus on the gap between 
the slow and difficult process of institutional integration 
of Turkey within the EU and the effectiveness of the 
Turkish lobbies full integration into the ‘insider circles’ of 
Brussels and thus, their commitment to European matters. 
I will then try to explain the process that leads these 
lobbies to Brussels: how did they get involved in European 
matters and how did they enter the Brussels polity? 
Beyond European accession, integration in Brussels  
Turkish interest groups: a part of life in the European capital  
Both European Commission Desks and the European 
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) are in close 
contact with about 10 Turkish lobbies. More or less the 
same numbers of Turkish lobbies (not necessarily the 
same ones) are also accredited to the European 
Parliament. This can be considered a high level of 
representation in comparison with other (former) 
candidate states. For example, before the 2004 
enlargement, the Network of Interest Representation Offices 
from Candidate Countries (NIROC) was composed of 24 
organisations (from 6 countries); of these, 8 were Turkish! 
European civil servants stress the involvement, the 
expertise and the key role played by these lobbies: “they 
are much more active and well organised than in other 
countries. They take a lot of initiative (…). Some of them 
meet very often the Commissionner (for Enlargement). 
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They have direct access to the policy-makers” (former civil 
servant at the DG Enlargement, Turkey desk). 
Turkish lobbies are also very well integrated in the 
Eurogroups. For example, one of the most influential 
business groups in Turkey, Turkish Industrialists’ and 
Businessmens’ Association (TÜSIAD) has been a member of 
the Industrial and Employers’ Confederation of Europe (UNICE) 
since 1987, while the Turkish Confederation of Employers 
Association (TISK) has also been a member since 1988. In 
1996, the Chairman of the Board of Directors of TÜSIAD 
was elected to the vice presidency of UNICE. In 1998, 
taking into account the increasing number of candidate 
states, UNICE totally reviewed its internal structure, 
distinguishing three different statuses: “observers”, who 
are simply informed of UNICE work; “associate members”, 
who are involved in different boards and working groups 
but without voting rights (this status is only for 
organisations coming from the candidate states that have 
started accession negotiations); and “full members”, 
organisations from EU member states. Despite this 
reform, TUSIAD and TISK still have the status of “full 
member” (which was not the case before 2004 
enlargement of the EEC’s organisations). As a first level 
social partner, UNICE shares with the European Trade 
Union Confederation (ETUC) and the European Centre of 
Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of 
General Economic Interest (CEEP) the right to initiate EU 
legislation in social and employment policies. Therefore, 
despite the absence of such a mechanism at national level, 
TÜSIAD and TISK became part of a governance structure 
guaranteeing their formal participation in policy making 
(Atan 2004). 
In 1995, during the negotiation of the customs union, 
TÜSIAD opened its own desk in Brussels. TÜSIAD was 
one of the most important protagonists in the lobbying 
campaign during the customs union negotiations. It 
“became engaged in an unprecedented effort to seek the 
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collaboration of the European business community in 
gaining the approval of the European Parliament for a 
Turkey-EU customs union” (Atan, 2004: 104). By the end 
of the 1980s, TÜSIAD began to exert pressure on the 
Turkish government. The organisation had come forward 
“with loudly expressed demands for the expansion of 
political liberalisation and for deepening of 
democratisation” (Yilmaz, 1999: 185). It became a keen 
advocate of Turkey’s accession to the EU, not only for 
economic but also for political reasons. After the 
Luxembourg summit decision of December 1997, which 
rejected Turkish candidacy to the EU, TÜSIAD strongly 
fostered a public debate on political issues within Turkey, 
and lobbied EU institutions and governments. Since then, 
TÜSIAD has continued to advocate EU membership for 
Turkey.  
Business lobbies are not the only Turkish interest groups 
integrated in Eurogroups. Four Turkish Trade Unions are 
affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC). The Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of 
Turkey (DISK) is the only Turkish trade union which has a 
representative in Brussels, something it has had since 
1980. Its relations with the European Trade Unions 
Confederation are very good. It plays a role of mediator 
between other Turkish Trade Union members and 
European organisations. Moreover, DISK is highly 
involved in a Meda project in Turkey. ETUC does not 
make any distinction between Turkish Trade Unions and 
other members. Moreover, it has always been a keen 
advocate of Turkish membership to the EU. 
The limits of usual explanations of the “Europeanisation” of 
Turkish interest groups 
The Europeanisation approach covers a very broad 
spectrum (Olsen, 2002) and the notion of 
Europeanisation has been blurred by the extensive use 
that scientists have made of it (Besnaie and Pasquier, 
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2007), especially concerning EU candidate states 
(Dokowska & Neumayer, 2005). I would like to underline 
two potential hurdles when the researcher encounters 
when using this notion to explain the commitment of 
Turkish interest groups in European matters and their 
very high integration in the Brussels polity. 
The first problem arises if one takes the independent 
variable to be the European Union in order to shed light 
on the institutional and diplomatic relationships between 
the EU and Turkey and the commitment of Turkish 
interest groups. It could be argued that the economic 
integration process and Customs Union have played a key 
role in the increasing number of Turkish interest groups 
in European issues. According to this way of thinking, new 
Turkish interest groups have been created directly in 
Brussels following the integration of Turkey within 
European programmes (like the Framework program in 
the field of Research). 
However, the institutional timing of the relationships 
between Turkey and EU does not entirely match that of 
the Turkish lobbies setting up in Brussels. For example, 
certain Turkish interest groups opened an office in 
Brussels in 1984, despite the loose official relationships 
between the EEC and Turkey that existed at the time 
(after the 1980 military coup d’Etat). 
I would like to demonstrate that focusing on institutional 
relationships between the EU and Turkey or on the 
accession process is not helpful in order to understand the 
commitment of these social actors. Scholars working on 
candidate countries often use the model of conditionality 
and constraints resulting form the accession process. This 
model seems to be simplistic (Dakoswka & Saurugger, 
2005); analyses should also take into account the 
mobilisation of various political and social actors and their 
interactions with institutions or others actors at local, 
national and European (or even international) levels. 
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Rather than being constrained by European demands, the 
actors re-evaluate and redefine their own resources, 
identities, and political preferences within the new 
dynamics of domestic political context in light of the EU 
integration process. 
A second problem arises if one considers 
“Europeanisation” in a normative way. “Europeanisation” 
is sometimes used to imply a presumed “European 
identity”, “European values” or a “European way of 
acting”. In that sense, the commitment of Turkish interest 
groups is related to the ontology of the organisations. 
Turkey is indeed much more familiar with capitalism than 
the East European Countries. Furthermore, the 
“European identity of Turkey” has been one of the main 
roots of the Turkish Republic since its beginning and has 
become an ideological reference shared by most of the 
elite in Turkey. However, this does not help us to 
understand why the commitment to European issues can 
vary so much between one business organisation and 
another one. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the 
“European” discourse adopted by a part of Turkish elite 
does not necessarily equate to a will to bring Turkey in 
line with European standards (Avci 2004; Elmas 1998). 
Finally, this does not provide with any means of 
understanding why some interest groups or elites which 
were very far from the “European identity” or “European 
issues” have become involved in it. This means that 
scholars must be very careful when they analyse the 
discourse of the actors, especially concerning identity. 
Rather than taking an ontological perspective, I prefer to 
analyse the commitment of Turkish interest groups in 
European issues as the outcome of a dialectic process. To 
do so, I will focus on the trajectories of various Turkish 
interest groups, with an interactionnist perspective. I will 
pay attention to the transformation of the definition of a 
situation in the course of the time, to the factors that 
condition a commitment at a given time but that cannot 
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explain the all trajectory and to the sequences of 
commitments. 
Process of commitment to European matters  
I do not consider Europeanisation as a new theory, but as 
an approach that can “provide a valuable shift of focus by 
generating a set a questions for the analysis of the 
interplay between different level of governance” (Radaelli, 
2004: 15). Nor do I consider Europeanisation as a process 
that reinforces the Europeanness (in a normative sense) 
of an actor. Europeanisation refers to the way national 
actors are affected by how they use Europe.   
If  Radaelli’s  well-known  definition  of  Europeanisation1 
covered both a bottom up and a top-down process, this 
latter concentrated on the impact of European 
integration on policy making of members countries 
(including actors, policy problems, instruments, resources 
and style). He does not consider how European politics 
and policy affect the new member states or the candidate 
states. Subsequently a more dynamic, interactive and 
sociological perspective was brought to the concept of 
Europeanisation, which has been taken into account by 
Radaelli: “domestic actors can use Europe in many 
discretionary ways. They may discursively create impacts. 
They may draw on Europe as a resource without specific 
pressure from Brussels. They may get entrapped in 
European discourses and socialisation processes that 
cannot be captured by narrow notion of impact (Jacquot 
1  “Europeanisation consists of processes of a) construction, b) diffusion 
and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, 
policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and 
norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy 
process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and 
subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies” 
(Radaelli, 2000: 4). 
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and Woll, 2003; Thatcher, 2004). Europeanisation deals 
with how domestic change is processed, and the patterns 
of adaptation can be more complex than simple reaction 
to ‘Brussels’” (Radaelli, 2004: 4) 
With reference to TÜSIAD and DISK, the insertion of 
both structures in Eurogroups went together with a shift 
of their internal organisation, their discourses and (more 
or less) their norms. I would like to show how EU 
involvement is not explained by the pressure of 
conditionality, but rather to an opportunity that can be 
exploited by very different groups. However, this 
opportunity not only gives the actors additional or new 
resources to exert influences, but also constrains their 
autonomy, increasing mutual interdependency with 
European networks.  
I will present a comparative in-depth analysis of the 
trajectory of only two Turkish interest groups: TÜSIAD, 
Turkish industrialists’ and businessmen’s’ association and 
DISK, Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Trade Unions of 
Turkey. I chose them because although they come from 
very different backgrounds, they are both closely involved 
in European issues.  
In fact, DISK has a strong leftist orientation. From its 
foundation in 1967, it developed a program based on the 
struggle of the working class. For a long time, DISK 
distanced itself from European issues. Domestically-
oriented social groups didn’t pay much attention to the 
EU as they considered it to be a foreign matter. Moreover, 
leftist groups used to be suspicious towards the EU (and 
some continue to be so). They emphasise the neo-
colonialist or imperialist project and objectives of the EU 
enlargement process. Even if DISK is the second largest 
trade union federation in Turkey, it is not possible to 
compare its social position to that of TÜSIAD. With 
regard to the history and the current situation of trade 
unions in Turkey we can consider DISK to be a relatively 
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weak group, whereas TUSIAD is one of the most 
influential business association. Following the 1980 
military coup, the military regime banned independent 
union activity. DISK’s assets were confiscated and put 
under trustee administration. DISK leaders were arrested 
and put on trial, facing the death penalty on the grounds 
that they “had attempted to demolish the constitutional regime". 
The military court decided in 1981 to close DISK and a 
law issued in May 1983 restricted the establishment of new 
trade unions. In 1991 the Military Court of Appeals 
overruled the decision to close DISK and acquitted the 
union leaders. DISK was able to resume its activities after 
an interval of 12 years. Although a new labour law was 
issued in 2003, some restrictions and limitations still exist 
(concerning civil servants and the right to strike). 
Beyond the different background of these two interest 
groups and their own specificity, I point out three 
distinctive steps that characterise the process of their 
commitment to European matters and that could be a 
pattern in order to analyse the Europeanisation of other 
social actors. Both TÜSIAD and DISK were founded as 
organsations autonomous of the State and opposed to its 
bureaucracy (1). Since then, this aim has never been 
abandoned. In this struggle, the EU became an important 
resource (2). However, the utilisation of this resource has 
not been neutral and slowly the organisations have been 
affected by an adaptation process, which has modified 
them (3). 
The struggle for autonomy from the state  
Both TÜSIAD and DISK were set up in order to escape 
from the state high control of what could be named 
corporatist structures. “The few sectoral associations, that 
were founded after one-party rule had ended [1950], 
remained of restricted impact” (Vorhoff, 2000: 149). This 
need for autonomy seems to be a common factor of high 
involvement in European issues.  
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Since 1952, the interests of Turkish merchants, 
industrialists, and commodity brokers have only been 
represented through their compulsory membership of the 
Union of Chambers of Commerce, Industry, Maritime 
Commerce and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey (TOBB). 
New associations representing the interests of private 
industry challenged TOBB’s position as the authoritative 
spokesman for ‘free enterprise’ in Turkey. The Union of 
Chambers of Industry was founded in 1967 within TOBB. 
This coalition improved co-ordination of industrialists’ 
demands but was unable to acquire independent status. In 
1971, the Turkish Industrialist and Business Association was 
founded by representatives of the fastest-growing sector of 
the economy. This group was concerned about the 
planned economy that was ineffective. It sought a retreat 
of the state. It also worried about the strengthening of left 
ideology and the potential shift to sovietic economy. 
TUSIAD aimed to compete on foreign markets, to enter 
the world market and to insitituionalise the free market 
economy. TÜSIAD wished to be a “more ambitious 
voluntary employers’ organisation with nation wide and 
supra-sectoral pretensions. (…) In contrast to [other] 
corporations, TÜSIAD pursued a highly selective 
membership policy” (ibidem). It aims to promote the 
identity of the entrepreneurial class. 
In the labour field, the Confederation of Turkish Trade 
Unions (Türk-Is) was founded in 1952 at government 
instigation to serve as an independent umbrella group. 
Under the tutelage of Türk-Is, labour evolved into a well-
organised interest group; but the organisation was not 
really autonomous from the government which made use 
of it to temper workers’ wage demands, for example. The 
more liberalised political climate of the 1960s and its 
social consequences (strikes, lockouts, and collective 
bargaining were legalised in 1963) paved the way to set up 
new trade unions. In 1967, workers’ dissatisfaction with 
Türk-Is as the representative of their interests led to the 
founding of the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers’ Trade 
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Unions of Turkey, DISK, which split from Türk-Is. The 
independence of this new trade union was seen as a threat 
both by the government and Türk-Is. However, the rapid 
growth of the popularity of DISK among the workers 
forced the government to retreat from a bill to abolish 
DISK in 1970. By 1980 about 500,000 workers belonged to 
unions affiliated with DISK. As previously stated, DISK was 
persecuted and thus abolished after the 1980 military 
coup d’Etat. 
Although, the institutions this paper is concernedwith 
(TOBB, TÜSIAD, Türk-Is, and DISK) are now all 
members of different social European organisations 
(Eurogroups), beyond their apparent European 
enthusiasm there is a gap concerning their attitudes 
towards European matters and the accession process of 
Turkey. The distinction is not a sectoral one, but gathers 
TOBB and Tük-Is on the one hand, TÜSIAD and DISK on 
the other.  
Upon its return to power in 1983, the civilian government 
ruled by T. Özal strongly reoriented economic policy 
towards liberalisation and integration into the world 
economy. In this context, TOBB began to assume the 
function of “economic diplomacy” (Bora 2000: 130). 
Under TOBB’s umbrella a Foundation for the economic 
development (IKV) was set up that specifically dealt with 
relations with the European Community. In 1984, IKV 
opened an agency in Brussels. In addition, TOBB entered 
the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry, Eurochambres, but only as an associate member. 
The application for full membership of Turkey in 1987 
sparked the interest of economic groups towards the EU. 
However, “in TOBB’s attitude towards the EU, from the 
mid-1980s onwards a continuous tension can be observed 
between the great desire for economic integration and a 
nationalist reactionary response to the conflicts over 
political issues and the delay in Turkey’s membership” 
(Bora 2000: 130). TOBB waited until the establishment of 
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the customs union, in 1996, to delegate its one 
representative in Brussels (located in the IKV office). In 
2004, the IKV representative in Brussels stated that some 
members of TOBB did not understand why the 
organisation was spending money on a representative in 
Brussels2. The start-up of the membership negotiations led 
TOBB to open its own office in Brussels in 2006/7. 
Meanwhile, from the beginning TÜSIAD put membership 
at the top of its agenda and took an active part in the 
debate about political reforms within Turkey.  
Just like DISK, Türk-Is, which is the biggest trade union 
confederation in Turkey, is a member of the ETUC. But, 
unlike DISK, the relationship between Türk-Is and the 
European Trade Union Confederation is often 
confrontational. Türk-Is has developed a very nationalistic 
discourse towards European trade unions and denounces 
them as agents of the European imperialism. It suspects 
the other Turkish trade union members of the ETUC of 
associating with the European trade unions in order to 
work against Turkish Unity. Turk-Is refused to take part in 
a MEDA project about Turkey which was launched and 
founded by the ETUC. DISK applied for membership of 
the ETUC in 1977 but entered the Eurogroup in 1985. 
Last but not least, DISK supports EU membership for 
Turkey: “The EU may be instrumental to social change. 
We know there is a big debate about social issues in 
European countries, and a struggle for a more social EU. 
Our strategy is to be a part of the debate “3. 
Thus far, we have connected the struggle for autonomy 
and involvement in European matters, but we still have to 
demonstrate the link between them.  
2  IKV’s representative in Brussels, Interview, May 2004. 
3  DISK’s Director of the International Department, Interview, January 
2006. 
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European Union: a resource in the struggle for autonomy from the 
state 
Although the processes that led TÜSIAD and DISK to 
commit themselves to European issues are quite different, 
the results are similar. “Europeanisation is largely 
conceived as an emerging political opportunity structure 
which offers [them] additional resources to exert 
influence” (Börzel and Risse 2000: 6) 
EUROPE provides new resources to TÜSIAD to enhance 
its autonomy from the state and to exert influence on the 
government. From its beginning, TÜSIAD has strongly 
supported Turkey’s EU membership for both foreign and 
domestic reasons. 
The foreign dimension was the insertion of Turkey into a 
world economy. It was mainly related to economic reasons 
and didn’t really distinguish TÜSIAD from the wills of 
other business organisations. TÜSIAD used to criticise the 
state’s policy based on substitution of imports. The 
organisation pushed for the liberalisation of the economy 
in order to externalise it and insert it into the world 
economy. Since 1980 and the government decision to 
open the economy, roughly half of Turkey’s trade has 
been with EU member states, foreign capital investments 
in Turkey are from EU member states, and the majority of 
tourists are from rich European countries. That is the 
reason why relationships with the EU have been seen as 
the best means of integration with the international 
economy.  
Beyond this obvious foreign interest shared by a part of 
the entrepreneurial class, TÜSIAD strategically lined up 
with the EU cause in the 90’s, in order to promote 
domestic changes. This distinguishes it from TOBB.  
To a certain extent, the post-1983 evolution of Turkey 
towards liberalisation the opening of the country and 
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European accession answered TÜSIAD demands. 
Moreover, as civilians came back to power, the basics of 
political democracy were restored (a relatively unfettered 
party competition, regular elections, and limited freedom 
of speech). TÜSIAD members at first supported the coup 
d’Etat of 1980. They thought it would prevent Turkey 
from the “Communist threat”. The new regime claimed 
that was committed to economic liberalisation. However, 
because of the coup d’Etat, the European Community 
suspended the Association Council. Since the middle of 
the 80’s, in the course of an internal transformation 
(which give more power to the young generation), 
TÜSIAD started to criticise the government. TÜSIAD 
emphasised the interdependence of economic and 
political liberalisation and promoted domestic political 
reforms in order  to “reduce the considerable autonomy 
of the bureaucracy and political class regarding the use of 
public resources, make bureaucrats and politicians more 
accountable to the general public, and ensure a 
meaningful participation of business association of public 
policies” (Yilmaz, 1999: 189). Since its inception TÜSIAD 
has questioned the centralisation and the unity of the 
Turkish state and has pushed for an end to orthodox 
Kemalism. These beliefs were not so easy to advocate as a 
domestic group: they “would have been (and were) easily 
ignored had they been voiced by domestic interest groups 
only” (ibidem). Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership 
and the domestic reforms required by the membership 
process had been strategically emphasised by the TÜSIAD 
in order to accentuate and to justify its own interests.  
In accordance with Keck & Sikkink’s “boomerang pattern” 
model (1998), DISK has used its commitment in 
European networks to strengthen its organisation and 
prevent it from the authoritarian state. DISK is the best 
example of the “capacity of the movements to mobilise 
actors who have large resources through transnational 
commitment” (Ongün 2005: 191). DISK is a priori further 
away than TÜSIAD from EU resources. It was a more 
Europeanisation
̱ 108 ̱
contingent process that led the organisation to promote 
European matters.  
After the Coups d’Etat of 1980, brought on by the state’s 
repression of left-wing organisations, one of the members 
of DISK went into exile in Brussels. “I arrived in Brussels by 
chance. I had been invited to a workshop, I knew people there”4. 
Some contacts had been established before between 
Turkish and European organisations over the 
international network of the trade unions (the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Union for example). 
Since this time, the European Trade Unions Confederation, 
ETUC, has played a major role in support of DISK. While 
the European Confederations helped DISK to recover 
properties confiscated from it, DISK opened a base within 
the ETUC’s building in Brussels. Even though DISK has 
been banned in Turkey, it has still continued to exist 
through the ETUC’s support.  
Although both organisations do not share the same 
proximity to the European project, they both “engage in 
strategic interactions using their resources to maximise 
their utilities on the basis of given, fixed and ordered 
preferences” (Börzel & Risse, Ibidem: 6). They both act in a 
“logic of consequentialism” (March & Olsen, 1998). 
However, although European political resources have 
been used by both organisations in order to pursue their 
own interests, the strategic use of these resources has 
impacted on both TÜSIAD and DISK. With reference to 
another trade union, E. Öngün (2005) speaks about the 
feedback impact of transnational strategie.  
 
 
4  DISK representative in Brussels, interview, May 2004. 
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The feedback impact of the resource  
The involvment of TÜSIAD and DISK in eurogroups have 
different effects. Rather than focusing on the process of 
institutional isomorphism that has affected both of the 
organisations, which lies outside the remit of this paper, I 
will rather analyse the constraints that are represented by 
the new opportunity structure.  
From its inclusion in UNICE, TÜSIAD has totally reviewed 
its organisational structure, implementing a new model 
adapted to those of its European Partners. Unlike other 
trade unions, DISK has largely developed its European 
department. DISK has also entered the Joint Consultative 
Committee, JCC, which was held by the European Economic 
and Social Council, in order to promote concerted action 
and good practices between economic, social and 
professional organisations from EU member states and 
Turkey. Both TÜSIAD and DISK played a prominent role 
in the institutionalisation of an Economic Social Committee in 
their country that has promoted social dialogue. The 
Economic Social Committee was set up in 2001. 
Apart from this institutional adaptation, EU resources 
provide new constraints for both the organzations. 
Neither DISK nor TÜSIAD were familiar with and 
ideologically in tune with the norm of “social dialogue” 5. 
Before 1980, DISK’s action used to be based on class 
struggle and on revolutionary concepts. For a long time, 
TÜSIAD understanding of Democracy did not encompass 
5  “Social dialogue is a unique and indispensable component of the 
European social model, with a clearly defined basis in the EC Treaty. 
It refers to the discussions, consultations, negotiations and joint 
actions undertaken by the social partner organisations representing 
the two sides of industry (management and labour)”. Europa -
Employment and social affairs’ web site. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/employment_social/social_dialogue/ 
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social democracy (Önis & Türem, 2001). Despite the 
reluctance to accept the concept, both of the 
organisations were obliged to do so through the 
eurogroup they belong to. UNICE is one European social 
partner that has the right to initiate EU legislation in 
social and employment policies. “This process visibly 
influenced (…) TÜSIAD’s understanding of social 
dialogue and participation in domestic policy-making” 
(Atan, 2004b). The European Trade Union 
Confederation –ETUC- shares with UNICE the right to 
initiate EU legislation in social and employment policies. 
The Eurogroup has played the same role of socialisation 
as UNICE did toward TÜSIAD. “Situated between the 
European political project and the national trade unions, 
the European Trade Union Cconfederation is used to 
being an institution that trains trade unionists in 
European matters. It works like a trade unions’ university 
where national trade unions experience European codes, 
especially practical and symbolic norms that are used in 
the European community sphere“ (Pernot, 1998: 61).  
What is very interesting concerning TÜSIAD is that this 
constraint has been taken as a new opportunity by a group 
inside the organisation. Once again, European issues have 
been used as a resource by a specific group that seeks 
greater empowerment. Once again, it has led to a 
redistribution of resources, not between TÜSIAD and 
state this time, but within TÜSIAD itself. In the mid 
1990’s, the young generation clashed with the older one, 
advocating not only economic reforms but also for 
political ones, in order to fit with EU standards and 
requirements. “There has been a long-lasting 
confrontation between the old and young generations of 
TUSIAD members, starting from the first critical stance of 
O. Dinçkök towards the government on democratic 
standards, until the publication of the report on 
democratisation [this report, written by B. Tanör in 1997, 
had strongly affected the pulic debate in Turkey]. 
Europeanisation shaped the priorities and the style of 
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TÜSIAD’s attitude in favour of the vision of its young-
generation leaders and led the organisation to be 
proactive on the political reform process” (Atan, 
2004a: 110). The success of the young generation led to a 
redefinition of the interests and identity of the 
organisation. TÜSIAD linked liberal economic thinking to 
liberal political ideas and embraced the cause of 
democratisation. It began to deal with taboo subjects such 
as Kurdish and Islamic issues. TÜSIAD is currently the 
keen advocate of deep reforms of the Turkish state, 
including very sensitive issues. 
This process highlights the overlapping of the two logic of 
“consequentialism” and “appropriateness” (March & 
Olsen, 1998). In this example, the strategical process of 
redistribution of resources goes hand to hand with 
collective learning processes resulting in norm 
internatinolization and development of new identities.  
Thus far, the same process has not taken place within 
DISK. The change within the organisation has been rather 
symbolic: DISK’s change is the evolution of the English 
translation of its name: from the Confederation of 
Revolutionary Workers Trade Unions of Turkey (literal 
translation of DISK) it has become the Confederation of 
Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey! The incorporation of the 
notion of “Social dialogue“ is a very long process. Despite 
the participation of the organisation in the Meda funding 
programme on social dialogue, there is still a huge gap 
between the DISK’s representative in Brussels and his 
colleagues in Turkey: “This language is very unusual for 
them”6. 
 
6  DISK’s representative in Brussels, interview, May 2004. 
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Conclusion  
Far from being an asymmetric process constraining the 
candidates countries through institutional conditionality, 
the Europeanisation of Turkish actors can be defined as a 
continuous interaction that provides both resources and 
constraints which pave the way to a conflictual process of 
adaptation. In order to better understand 
Europeanisation, further analysis needs to be carried out 
to take into account the historical trajectories of social 
actors within their own states. Instead of ‘impact of 
Europe’ it seems better to focus on the ‘use’ that actors 
make of it.  
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